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Representation of the Public Interest in Michigan· 
Utility Rate Proceedings 
l. INTRODUCTION 
While inflation has been a serious economic factor in this coun-
try since the mid-sixties, until recently consumers have been able to 
take comfort in stable or declining utility rates.1 However, substantial 
rate increases both across the nation2 and in Michigan3 have signaled 
the end of utility rate stability and have led consumers to focus at-
tention on state regulatory commissions and the process by which 
utility rates are determined.4 Prompted by rising utility rates that 
had increased the average utility bills paid by Detroiters by 27.1 per 
cent over four years, 5 the Detroit Free Press undertook a month-long 
study to determine "whether Michigan's rate-paying customers, the 
people who pay the bills, are adequately protected by the State of 
Michigan.''6 The study concluded, in part: 
The pressure for rate increases from eastern investment bankers and 
the utilities themselves has pushed the PSC [Michigan Public Ser-
vice Commission] to a philosophical position much friendlier to the 
utility companies than that held either by its own staff or the state 
attorney general's office. 
At the same time, the rate-paying public is inadequately represented 
in utility rate hearings before the PSC, and the commission is under-
1. Winter, Bigger Utility Bills: Rates for Electridty, Gas, Phone Head up After 
Years of Declines, Wall St. J., Dec. 16, 1969, at 1, col. 8 [hereinafter Winter]. The 
experience of the Detroit Edison Co., a major Michigan utility, is illustrative. In 1968, 
Edison sought its first rate increase in twenty years. Since that time, however, the 
company bas sought increases of 48 million dollars (Detroit Edison Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 
463 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1970)), 30 million dollars (Detroit Edison Co., 88 P.U.R. 
3d 68 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn. 1970)), and 70 million dollars (Detroit Edison Co., 
U-3910 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., filed May 3, 1971)). See 1971 DETROIT EDISON ANN. 
REP. 7; note 8 infra. ; 
2. Winter, supra note 1, at 1, col. 8. 
3. See MICH. Ptra. SERv. CoMMN., Summary of Recent Rate Cases [hereinafter 
Summary], on file with the Michigan Law Review; MICH. PUB. SERv. CoMMN., 1970-71 
rate case Revenue Grants, on file with the Michigan Law Review; note 8 infra. 
4. Lawson, Utilities' Friend?: California Commission Is Rapped for Handling of 
Regulatory Matters, Wall St. J., Feb. 29, 1972, at 1, col. 1 [hereinafter Lawson]; W"mter, 
supra note 1, at 1, col. 8. 
5. Cooper &: Shanahan, Utility Bills Rise 27 Pct. in 4 Years, Detroit Free Press, 
June 6, 1971, at 1, col. 3. 
6. Id. The study culminated in four articles: Cooper &: Shanahan, Utility Bills Rise 
27 Pct. in 4 Years, Detroit Free Press, June 6, 1971, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter Cooper, 
June 6]; Cooper &: Shanahan, Utilities Fear a Crisis in Cost Crush, Detroit Free Press, 
June 7, 1971, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter Cooper, June 7]; Cooper, Milliken Has Task: 
Filling Utility Post Ticklish, Detroit Free Press, June 8, 1971, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter 
Cooper, June SJ; Cooper, Why Your Utility Bills Are Going Up, Detroit Free Press, June 
9, 1971, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter Cooper, June 9]. 
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staffed and cannot keep adequate check on the performance of the 
utilities in providing service in fast-growing areas.7 
The Free Press study brought the operations of the Michigan 
Public Service Commission to public attention at a time when con-
sumer interest in utility rates was quite high. Although the Com-
mission has authorized less than fifty per cent of the aggregate 
requests made by the state's four major utilities since the middle of 
1969,8 its substantial disagreement with the recommendations of its 
7. Cooper, June 6, supra note 6, at 8-A, col. I. 
8. The four major utilities are Detroit Edison Co., Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., and Consumers Power Co. 
The following is a list of recently completed rate cases involving major Michigan 
utilities: 
Rate Adjustment Sought 
by Company/Granted 
Company by Commission 
Michigan Consoli- 78 P.U.R.3d 321 (1968) $ 2G,986,000/4,179,683 
dated Gas Co. 79 P.U.R.3d 375 (1969) 
U-3095 82 P.U.R.3d 379 (1970) 
Consumers Power 83 P.U.R.3d 188 (1970) 28,386,000 /21,308,000 
Co. [Gas] 
U-3110 
Consumers Power Co. 83 P.U.R.3d 188 (1970) 29,453,000/16,514,000 
[Electric] 
U-3179 
Detroit Edison Co. 83 P.U.R.3d 463 (1970) 48,000,000/6,514,872 
U-3189 
Michigan Bell 85 P.U.R.3d 467 (1970) 52,300,000/14,799,000 
Telephone Co. 
U-3204 
Detroit Edison Co. 88 P.U.R.3d 68 (1970) 30,000,000/19,043,000 
U-3697 
Michigan Consoli- 88 P.U.R.3d 168 (1971) 18,413,000/9,200,000 
dated Gas Co. 2,739,000 
U-3790 
Consumers Power Co. (Order of Dec. 14, 1971) 28,500,000/10,559,400 
[Electric] 
U-3749 
Michigan Consoli- (Order of Jan. 17, 1971) 27,513,460/27,513,460 
dated Gas Co. (reduced by) (5,366,000)/(5,366,000) 
U-3934 
Michigan Bell (Order of April 28, 1972) 59,663,000 / 43,779,000 
Telephone Co. 
U-3838 
$343,848,460/170,783,415 
•Consumers Power 
Co. [Gas] 
(Order of Dec. 22, 1971) $31,700,000/6,500,000 
U-3907 
•Detroit Edison Co. (Order of March 30, 1972) $70,000,000/25,000,000 
U-3910 
• Interim relief granted prior to determination of full case. Data in the above table 
was obtained from rate orders and opinions of the Michigan Public Service Commission. 
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staff and the state Attorney General have left it an appealing target 
for public criticism. 
Beyond the present conditions of rising utility rates, the conclu-
sions drawn by the Free Press study have serious long-range impli-
cations for the citizens of Michigan. With the growing awareness of 
the environmental implications of utility operations and the finite 
limitations of energy generation,9 state regulatory commissions 
are likely to broaden their range of regulatory investigations, even 
in the face of increasing federal regulation.10 Social problems such 
as the equity of utility rate structures11 have been and will con-
tinue to be raised before state commissions. To the extent that 
the Free Press study casts doubt on the ability of the Michigan 
Public Service Commission to protect the public interest during the 
present period of rising rates, it also challenges the ability of the 
Commission to protect the public interest in the wide range of other 
utility regulatory issues that seem destined to have an increasing 
impact on citizens of Michigan. 
Although the Free Press study centered on political and economic 
issues, the operation of the Michigan Public Service Commission also 
raises significant issues regarding the role of public intervenors, 
agency compliance with statutory requirements, statutory construc-
tion, and legislative response to regulatory deficiencies. This Com-
ment will consider the representation of the public interest in Mich-
igan utility proceedings in the context of rate cases involving the 
state's major utilities. While such an analysis does not reach the 
breadth of activities performed by the Commission, it is suggestive of 
the extent to which the Commission is responsive to the public inter-
est generally. Following a description of the rate determination 
9. The possibility of large-scale power blackouts in Michigan during the summer 
of 1972 has been noted by an official of the Consumers Power Co. and the Chairman of 
the Michigan Public Service Commission. Lane, Blackouts Loom in Power Shortage, 
Detroit Free Press, March 12, 1972, at 1-A, cols. 3-8. The Public Service Commission 
has scheduled a series of public hearings to discuss a ten-year plan to meet state energy 
demands "with the least possible harm to the environment." Serrin, State Sets Public 
Hearings On Long Range Power Plans, Detroit Free Press, April 11, 1972, at 3-A, cols. 
3-6. 
10. The increase in federal regulation is illustrated by FPC v. Florida Power &: Light 
Co., 404 U.S. 453 (1972) (sustaining FPC finding of transmission of electrical energy 
within interstate commerce); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 
(8th Cir. 1971), afjd., 40 U.S.L.W. 3483 (U.S. April 3, 1972) (sustaining federal pre-
. emption in regulation of nuclear power plants). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970) which 
provides: 
The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the operation of, or 
compliance with, any order affecting rates chargeable by a public utility and made 
by a State administrative agency or a rate-making body of a State political sub-
division, where: 
(I) Jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the 
order to the Federal Constitution; and, 
(2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and, 
(3) The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearings; and 
(4) A plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State. 
11. See text accompanying notes 57-64 infra. 
1370 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:1867 
process, consideration will be given to isolating deficiencies in the 
present process, suggesting reasonable corrective measures, and to a 
comparison of several bills pending in the Michigan legislature that 
would significantly affect utility regulation. 
II. THE DETERMINATION OF UTILITY RA.TES IN MICHIGAN 
Although authority to set utility rates is vested by statute in the 
Michigan Public Service Commission, 12 the plethora of recent appli-
cations for general rate increases has generated the emergence of a 
large number of intervenors who have sought to supplement the rep-
resentation of the public interest in Commission proceedings. In 
order to evaluate the adequacy of the present process, it is necessary 
to consider not only the operation of the Public Service Commission, 
but also the role played by intervenors. 
A. The Michigan Public Service Commission 
While Michigan utilities have been subject to some form of regu-
lation since the tum of this century, the Public Service Commission 
is only the latest in a long line of state agencies with jurisdiction over 
utilities. The office of Michigan Railroad Commissioner was estab-
lished in 187313 but was replaced by the Michigan Railroad Com-
mission in 1907.14 Two years later the Commission was replaced by 
a second Railroad Commission with broader responsibilities,16 but it 
was not until 1919 that the Michigan Public Utilities Commission 
was established.16 In addition to absorbing the duties of the Railroad 
Commission, the Public Utilities Commission was given jurisdiction 
over the state's utilities except for municipally owned utilities.17 
Legislative dissatisfaction with the operation of the Public Utilities 
Commission led to its abolition in 1939, at which time it was replaced 
by the Michigan Public Service Commission.18 The statutory au-
thority of the present Commission rides piggyback on its predecessors 
since no comprehensive attempt was made to delineate the authority 
of the Public Service Commission; instead, the statutes relating to 
the Public Utilities Commission and the Railroad Commission were 
made expressly applicable to the Public Service Commission.10 
12. MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 460.6 (1967). The numerous statutory provisions 
tracing the development and expansion of commission jurisdiction are listed in the 
1963 MICH. PUB. SERV. CoMMN. ANN. REP. 90-94. 
13. No. 79, [1873] Mich. Acts 91. 
14. No. 312, [1907] Mich. Acts 417. 
15. No. 300, [1909] Mich. Acts 704. 
16. No. 419, [1919] Mich. Acts 751. 
17. MICH. CoMP. LAws .ANN. § 460.54 (1967). 
18. No. 8, [1939] Mich. Acts 7, codified at MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 460.1-.6b (1967). 
19. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.4 (1967). 
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Failure to revise and update the statutes applicable to the Commis-
sion has resulted in a range of inconsistent and ambiguous statutes, 
thereby confusing the precise lines of Commission authority. 
Presently a division of the Michigan Department of Commerce,20 
the Public Service Commission consists of three commissioners ap-
pointed by the Governor,21 no more than two of whom may be mem-
bers of the same political party. The Commissioners serve staggered 
six-year terms22 and may not be "pecuniarily interested in any public 
utility or public service subject to the jurisdiction and control of the 
commission. "23 
The Commissioners preside over an Administrative Division and 
four operating divisions: Public Utilities; Finance, Accounts and 
Valuation; Railroad; and Transportation.24 Although only the Pub-
lic Utilities Division and the Finance, Accounts and Valuation Divi-
sion are directly connected with utility rate regulation, the other 
divisions occupy a substantial portion of the Commission's time and 
resources.25 
The Commission has explicit statutory authority to employ such 
personnel "as shall be necessary for the proper exercise of the powers 
and duties of the commission."26 Such authority is limited, however, 
by the annual state appropriation to the Commission. The staff pres-
ently devoted to utility matters (the Public Utilities Division and 
the Finance, Accounts and Valuation Division) consists of eleven 
engineers, nine accountants, and tw-o hearing examiners.27 Although 
the staff is generally recognized as well qualified, it is undermanned 
in comparison with regulatory staffs in comparable industrial states.28 
The precise role of the Commission staff is not designated in the 
statutes, but it appears that the staff was originally designed to serve 
in an advisory capacity, assisting the Commissioners in the interpre-
tation of technical matters relating to regulatory activities. The only 
20. MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 16.331 (1967). 
21. MICH. COMP. LAws .ANN. § 460.1 (1967). Although the Commission originally 
consisted of five members, it was later reduced to three. No. 337, [1947] Mich. Acts 634. 
Presently serving as commissioners are: Willis F. Ward, chairman, reappointed to the 
Commission in 1969; Lenton G. Sculthorp, appointed to the Commission in 1969; and 
William R. Ralls, appointed to the Commission in 1971. 
22. MICH. COMP. LAWS .ANN. § 460.1 (1967). 
23. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.1 (1967). 
24. 1969 MICH. PUB. SERV. CoMMN. ANN. REP. 1. Although the 1969 Report indicates 
only three operating divisions, the Research and Statistics Section of the Public 
Utilities Division has since been elevated to divisional status as the Finance, Accounts 
and Valuation Division. 
25. The Commission budget more than doubled between fiscal 1968 and 1969 
because it assumed the duties of administration and enforcement of vehicle and weight 
limits. See 1969 MICH. PUB. SERv. CoMMN . .ANN. REP. at 2. 
26. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 460.3 (1967). 
27. Cooper, June 6, supra note 6, at 8-A, cols. 6-7. 
28. Id. See note 101 infra. 
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explicit duty of the staff to investigate a public utility is in connec-
tion with requests for partial interim relief pending full Commission 
consideration of a company's request for rate relief.29 In recent years 
the Commission has operated under the judicial model in its con-
sideration of rate petitions.30 Under this model, the staff operates as 
an adversary party in rate hearings conducted by the Commission. 
When a rate application is filed by a utility, the staff conducts an 
audit of the utility, prepares financial exhibits, and testifies at the 
hearings. It acts as an independent party, rarely consulting the Com-
missioners regarding the case until the formal hearing. 
At the formal hearings, the utility company and the staff present 
their positions in a manner similar to a judicial proceeding. The 
Commissioners receive testimony and exhibits as a matter of first 
impression, unprejudiced by prior consultation with staff members. 
Although the staff has conducted the technical and financial investi-
gation of the utility, the presentation of the staff position before the 
Commission is made by an Assistant Attorney General who has been 
assigned to the Public Service Division of the Attorney General's 
office to serve as legal advisor to the Commission. At the conclusion 
of the hearings, the Commissioners retire to review the testimony and 
issue a written opinion and order setting the utility rates. In recent 
years, the relief granted by the Commission has fallen between the 
recommendations of the staff and the requests of the companies.31 
Under the rule-making authority granted by the Administrative 
Procedures Act of 1969,32 the Commission has adopted Rules of 
Practice and Procedure Before the Commission that govern the pro-
cedural operation of Commission business.33 These rules provide the 
criteria for intervention, complaints, and the conduct of formal 
hearings. 
B. Intervenors 
The Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure provide that 
a person who claims an interest in a pending proceeding may petition 
for leave to intervene, and if granted, shall be considered a full party 
29. l\!ICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.6a (1967). 
20. See Cramton, Some Modest Suggestions for Improving Public Utility Rate 
Proceedings, 51 IowA L. ru:v. 267, 271-75 (1966), for a brief discussion of the judicial 
model in utility regulation. 
21. See note 8 supra; Cooper, June 6, supra note 6, at 8-A, col. 4. 
22. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.§§ 24.201-315 (Supp. 1972). 
22. MICH. PUB. SERV. COMMN., RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE BEFORE THE 
COMMISSION (1968). Commission rules may also be found in the 1954 Mich. Adminis-
trative Code (Supp. 1968). Although promulgated prior to the passage of the Adminis-
trative Procedures Act of 1969, these rules continue to remain in effect. MICH, COMP, 
LAws ANN. § 24.221(1) (Supp. 1972). 
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to the proceeding.34 Since the growth in the number and magnitude 
of rate increases granted by the Commission began in 1969, the Com-
mission has granted leave to intervene to numerous parties. Attention 
will be given to a sample of the major intervenors. 
I. The Attorney General 
Attorney General Frank J. Kelley commenced intervening in 
utility rate cases in 1968 when the Public Service Commission 
granted Michigan Bell Telephone Company a selective rate increase 
without holding a public hearing.35 In response to the Attorney Gen-
eral's threat to appeal, the Commission ordered public hearings to 
reconsider the increase sought by the company. Prior to those hear-
ings, however, the company withdrew its request for rate relief.36 
Since that time the Attorney General has intervened in almost 
every rate case commenced by a major Michigan utility.37 Although 
his office does not conduct a complete independent audit of company 
books, it often employs accountants to verify company expenditures 
for specific items and does have access to the results of investigations 
conducted by the Commission staff.38 The issues raised by the Attor-
ney General cover a broad range of utility activities, and the Attorney 
General often presents expert witnesses to testify regarding rates of 
return or accounting procedures.39 Specific utility practices such as 
the propriety of utility advertising, employment discrimination, de-
preciation rates and accounting for gains on debt repurchases have 
been challenged.40 The Attorney General remains active in pending 
cases, and future intervention depends only upon the availability 
of financing and legal manpower conversant with utility matters.41 
The Attorney General has been perhaps the most outspoken 
critic of the major utility companies during this recent period of 
rising rates.42 While the four major Michigan utilities sought rate 
increases totaling over 215 million dollars in the rate cases completed 
34. :M1CH. ADMIN. C. R. 460.21, R. 460.23 (1968). 
35. N.Y. Times, July 31, 1968, at 53, col. 7; Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 1968, at 9, col. 6. 
36. Wall St. J., Aug. 8, 1968, at 9, col. 6. 
37. Assistant Attorney General Hugh B. Anderson has been the Attorney General's 
representative before the Commission. Although an Assistant Attorney General is 
present during the hearings to represent the staff, the activities of Mr. Anderson as an 
intervenor are completely separate from the presentation of the staff position. 
38. Letter from Hugh B. Anderson to student author, Feb. 15, 1972, at 1-2, on file 
with the Michigan Law Review [hereinafter Anderson Jetter, Feb. 15]. 
39. Id. at 2. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 2-3. 
42. See generally Statement of Frank J. Kelley, Attorney General of Michigan, to 
the Price Commission, Washington, D.C., Feb. 26, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law 
Review. 
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in 1969 and 1970, the Attorney General recommended rate decreases 
of 144 million dollars in those same cases. 43 The prevailing opinion 
is that intervention by the Attorney General has had a positive im-
pact on the regulatory process by supplementing the Commission staff 
in representing the public interest.44 
2. The City of Detroit 
The City of Detroit has intervened regularly in rate cases in-
volving utilities that service the Detroit area46 for over thirty years.40 
Because of the limited monetary resources available to the city at-
torney for such intervention, the city has followed a less ambitious 
strategy than the Attorney General. 
The City of Detroit does not conduct its own audit or field 
43. Selected rate cases completed in 1969 and 1970: 
Company 
Michigan Consoli-
dated Gas Co. 
U-3095 
Consumers Power Co. 
[Gas] 
U-3110 
Consumers Power Co. 
[Electric] 
U-3179 
Detroit Edison Co. 
U-3189 
Michigan Bell 
Telephone Co. 
U-3204 
Detroit Edison Co. 
U-3697 
78 P.U.R.3d 321 (1968) 
79 P.U.R.3d 375 (1969) 
82 P.U.R.3d 379 (1970) 
83 P.U.R.3d 188 (1970) 
83 P.U.R.3d 188 (1970) 
83 P.U.R.3d 463 (1970) 
85 P.U.R.3d 467 (1970) 
88 P.U.R.3d 68 (1970) 
Data obtained from Summary, supra note 3. 
Rate Adjustment Sought by 
Company/Recommended by 
Attorney General 
$ 26,986,000/(8,600,000) to 
(11,300,000) 
28,386,000 / (136,000) 
29,453,000/(19,554,000) 
48,000,000 / (37,432,000) 
52,300,000/(49,456,000) 
30,000,000 / (28,a21,ooo) 
$215,125,000/(143,499,000) to 
(146,199,000) 
44. There has been some speculation in the press that the Attorney General's inter-
vention in rate cases has been in part motivated by a desire to establish an image as a 
guardian of the consumer interest in anticipation of the 1972 United States senatorial 
election in Michigan. See Cooper, June 9, supra note 6, at 4-A, col. 6. Such speculation 
may have detracted from the effectiveness of the Attorney General's intervention to the 
extent that some parties to the process may discount his recommendations because of 
the suspected motive. 
45. Of the four major Michigan utilities under consideration (see note 8 supra), 
only Consumers Power Co. does not service the Detroit area. 
46. Letter from Robert Reese, Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of Detroit, to 
student author, April 6, 1972, on file with the Michigan IAw Review [hereinafter Reese 
letter]. Mr. Reese has intervened on behalf of the City of Detroit for over fifteen years. 
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work investigations, nor work closely with the Commission staff. 
Rather than challenge the accuracy of particular utility expendi-
tures, the city has challenged the propriety of including certain util-
ity expenses in the operating expenses on which utility rates are 
based. In recent years the city has questioned the propriety of con-
sidering advertising expenditures and executive fringes (such as 
membership dues in Detroit area social organizations) in the deter-
mination of utility rates.47 
Perhaps more importantly, the city regularly presents its own 
expert ·witnesses to testify at rate hearings regarding the rate of return 
that the Public Service Commission should allow.48 The city has 
spent approximately 25,000 dollars per rate case49 in order to present 
a utility specialist who is neither connected with the state nor paid 
by the utility companies. Although the city cannot be expected to 
expand its role in Commission proceedings because of its :financial 
limitations, it does provide additional information on which the 
Commission may base its decision. 
3. United Auto Workers 
A more recent entrant into the regulatory field is the United 
Auto Workers, which has intervened in two rate cases and has been 
actively engaged in legislative efforts to alter the process by which 
rates are determined.60 The strategy of the UAW in the recent 
Michigan Bell Telephone Co. case51 is illustrative of the role it can 
be expected to play in the regulatory process. The UAW cross-exam-
ined staff and company witnesses, made specific recommendations 
regarding the Bell rate structure, and attacked Bell advertising. 52 
Limited technical skill and funding will prevent the UAW from 
examining utility :financial records and facilities on which aggregate 
utility revenues are based, but in specialized areas the UAW may be 
able to challenge utility practices more vigorously than even the 
Commission staff. In the Bell case, for example, the UAW argued 
that the company had falsely advertised to its customers that any 
increase in telephone bills would be due to increased phone usage 
rather than increased rates. After evidence was presented regarding 
misleading advertisements, the parties agreed at a settlement con-
ference that Bell would publish a clarification to be inserted in a 
47. Id. at 2. 
48. Id. at I. 
49. Id. 
50. Letter from Daniel P. Dozier, Assistant Legal Counsel, Community Action Pro-
gram Dept., UAW, to student author, April 21, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law 
Review [hereinafter Dozier letter]. 
51. U-3838 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., April 28, 1972). 
52. Dozier letter, supra note 50, at I. 
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monthly billing.153 The UAW also participated, in conjunction with 
the Attorney General's office and the City of Detroit, in an attack on 
Detroit Edison Company advertising arising from rate case U-3910.'H 
The Public Service Commission subsequently ordered Edison to 
charge the cost of advertising relating to that case to its stockholders 
and to cease and desist from any further such advertising during 
the pendency of the case.66 Since utility advertising does not consti-
tute a large component of cost of service, it is unlikely that the Com-
mission staff would have challenged advertising practices. And yet, 
because public opinion can have an impact on the rate policy of the 
company and the Commission, care must be taken to assure that the 
public in general, and rate-payers and stockholders in particular, do 
not receive distorted impressions of the impact and cause of rising 
rates. 
The UAW can also promote the public interest through its lobby-
ing activities in the Michigan legislature. Significant legislation is 
now pending that would have an enormous impact on the Public 
Service Commission, and the UAW can act to balance the input 
which the full-time lobbyists of the major Michigan utilities exert 
on the legislative process.66 
4. Consumer Alliance of Michigan 
Although the Consumer Alliance of Michigan has formally in-
tervened in the most recent Detroit Edison case, 67 it has concentrated 
53. The false advertising charges were treated as a formal complaint and were as-
signed docket number U-3986, and subsequently dismissed by stipulation of the parties. 
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., U-3986 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., Nov. 10, 1971). 
A copy of the stipulation is on file with the Michigan Law Review. The clarifi-
cation was sent to Bell customers in the December 1971 phone bills. In relevant part the 
statement, which was entitled Let's Try Once More, reads: 
In our advertising, we stated that "increased bills come largely from increased 
usage (not increased rates)." This has been true for many years, However, it is also 
true that bills went up because of the October, 1970 rate increase, quite apart from 
any increase in usage. 
We also said that customers should not expect the proposed rate increase to 
make a big difference in their phone bills. However, families on low or fixed in• 
comes, particularly those who don't make long distance or zone calls, may feel that 
the proposed increase is substantial. 
On file with the Michigan Law Review. 
54. Dozier letter at I. See also Letter from Hugh B. Anderson to student author, 
May 22, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
55. Detroit Edison Co., U-3910 at 11 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., Feb. 21, 1972), 
Edison has appealed this order. No. 14214-C, (Cir. Ct., Ingham County, filed March 22, 
1972). 
The Commission declined to adjourn hearings on the rate case pending disposition 
of the advertising charges, and instead assigned docket number U-4068 to the advertising 
complaint. See Mich. Dept. of Commerce, News Service, Feb. 22, 1972, on file with the 
Michigan Law Review. 
56. See note 186 infra and accompanying text. 
57. Detroit Edison Co., U-3910 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., March 30, 1972). 
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its efforts on a suit filed against the Public Service Commission and 
the Detroit Edison Company seeking invalidation of any Commis-
sion order in the Edison case that provides for the decreasing-cost 
structure of utility rates presently used by Edison.58 The Consumer 
Alliance seeks to open the Commission process to the general citi-
zenry and put the concept of "public" back into the Public Service 
Commission.59 It is difficult to determine whether the Consumer 
Alliance seeks alteration of the judicial model under which the 
Commission presently conducts rate cases or whether it is merely 
angry with what it perceives is a pro-utility bias of the regulators.60 
The plaintiffs, having been told by the Wayne County circuit 
court to exhaust available administrative remedies, introduced direct 
testimony in the Edison case regarding the need for nonpromotional 
electric rates in Detroit Edison's domestic service classifications.61 
Two months later the Public Service Commission granted Edison 
interim rate relief of twenty-five million dollars but provided that 
[t]he Domestic Rates are so structured that this interim increase has 
no effect on the small or medium volume residential customer but 
does affect the large volume customer, the larger the volume, the 
greater the effect of the increase. 62 
The Commission utilized the testimony provided by the Consumer 
Alliance of Michigan in reaching its determination on the rate 
structure of the allowed interim increase. 63 Because of the implica-
58. Shavers v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., No. 195-719R (Cir. Ct. Wayne County, filed 
Dec. IO, 1971). Because of the large economies of scale involved in utility oper-
ations, utilities operate on declining average cost curves. Under marginal cost pric-
ing associated with welfare economic theory, utility prices would be set equal to 
marginal costs. However, because of the downward sloping average total cost curves, 
marginal cost is less than average total cost so that marginal pricing turns natural 
monopolies into money losers. One possible solution to this problem is to permit a 
utility to discriminate in price, thereby charging high unit prices for that part of de-
mand that is inelastic and charging lower unit prices at higher levels of consumption 
when the elasticity of demand is higher. Such promotional pricing has increased the 
demand for utility companies and has only recently come under attack because of the 
environmental and aggregate energy ramifications of such a pricing policy. See generally 
L. WEISS, CASE STUDIES IN .AMERICAN INDUSTRY 88-144 (1971); F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL 
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 519-23 (1971). 
59. Conversation between V. Paul Donnelly, Attorney, Wayne County Neighbor-
hood Legal Services (Counsel for the Consumer Alliance), and student author, Nov. 
1971. 
60. See Cooper, June 8, supra note 6, at 2-A, cols. 2-5. 
61. J. Musial, Punuc UTILITIES AND PJl.lCE D1scruMINATION, Testimony and Exhibits 
of J. Musial delivered in Support of Detroit Model Neighborhood Citizens and the 
Consumer Alliance of Michigan, Jan. 19, 1972, before the Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn. in 
Detroit Edison Co., U-3910, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
62. Detroit Edison Co., U-3910 at 13 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., March 30, 1972). 
63. Conversation betiveen John J. Musial, Head Social Planning Analyst, City Plan-
ning Commission, City of Detroit, and student author, May 6, 1972. See note 61 supra. 
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tions and possible ramifications of this rate structure modification64 
it is clear that this citizens' group has had a significant impact on 
Commission decision-making. 
General consumer groups realistically can be expected to have 
some input into the regulatory process. The history of the Edison 
case and the reaction of the Commission to the pressures of invest-
ment bankers and utility interests65 indicate that the Commission is 
not immune to outside criticism and pressure. However, the funding 
uncertainties that frequently characterize consumer groups make it 
unwise to depend on them for continuous and aggressive participa-
tion.66 
5. Assessment of Contribution of Interoenors 
The Detroit Free Press noted in 1971 that in comparison with 
other industrial states, few outsiders take part in Michigan rate cases. 67 
In the year since that article was written, the Public Service Com-
mission has seen a dramatic rise in number and force of public 
intervenors. In two areas the intervenors have been able to make 
dramatically positive inputs into the regulatory scheme. The con-
sideration presently being given by the Commission to the equity 
of utility rate structures represents a new and potentially far-reaching 
method of redistributing the burden of utility rate increases. It is 
significant that the impetus for rate evaluation came not from the 
Commission staff nor upon directive from the Commission, but 
rather from the Consumer Alliance of Michigan and the UAW. In 
the area of legislative reform, the UAW offers a welcome counter-
weight to the utility lobbies which until recently have been the only 
major input at the legislative level. While it may not be within the 
64. Commissioner Ralls observed that the interim order "marks the beginning of 
efforts to reduce price discrimination" and noted that "the new rate increase design for 
Detroit Edison's residential customers will mark the turning point in the development 
of a pricing policy for electricity to meet the new economic and environmental problems 
confronting the electric utilities today." U-3910 Order, supra note 62, at 4 (Commr. Ralls 
concurring). 
The progressive rate structure ordered for Edison applied only to the increase and 
not to the over-all structure. Furthermore, the result of the order is merely to return 
the rate structure to the relationship that existed in the early sixties before limited pr1ce 
reductions were ordered for Detroit Edison. When those reductions were ordered, the 
company successfully applied the lower rates to the high volume users thereby further• 
ing discrimination in pricing. Conversation between Hugh B. Anderson and student 
author, April 18, 1972. 
65. A 1969 "newswire" release by a major investment firm urged its brokers to dis• 
courage further investment in Michigan utilities because of the low rate of return al-
lowed by the Commission. It has been suggested that the pressure resulting from this 
release led the Commission to allow higher returns on common stock equity in subse-
quent rate cases. Cooper, June 7, supra note 6, at 1, cols. 3-8. 
66. See generally Cramton, The Why, Where and How of Broadrned Public Par-
ticipation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO, L.J. 525, 537-46 (197~). 
67. Cooper, June 6, supra note 6, at 8-A, col. 5, 
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traditional parameters of "intervention" to so characterize the lobby-
ing efforts of the UAW, an important void in the effective representa-
tion of the public interest is being filled. 
The recent emergence of multiple public intervenors also reveals 
the limitations of intervention. The utilities and some members of 
the Commission have objected to the delay in rate hearings that is 
caused by repetitive and uncoordinated examination of witnesses 
and presentation of data by intervenors.68 These delays have resulted 
in legislative proposals to allow the automatic implementation of 
utility rate increases after a prescribed number of months even if 
the Commission has not finished consideration of the rate petition.69 
While the intervenors may regard all possible delay in the implemen-
tation of higher rates as a desired goal, ultimately the public interest 
is furthered by the timely implementation of needed rate increases 
which permit utility companies to provide the necessary services. 
The form that public intervention has taken, namely attack on 
broad regulatory policies such as the rate structure and the advertis-
ing policies of utilities, reveals also that the Commission staff plays 
an indispensable role in the determination of utility rates. None of 
the intervenors possess the funds or the expertise to determine in-
dependently the aggregate revenue requirements of major utility 
companies. In the routine financial and technical aspects of rate 
determination on which the substance of aggregate utility revenues 
are based, the public will have to rely primarily on the Public Ser-
vice Commission, through the Commission staff, to represent ade-
quately the public interest in utility rate cases. 
Ill. DEFICIENCIES IN THE PRESENT PROCESS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Examination of the process by which utility rates are determined 
in Michigan and discussions with the principal participants in the 
process reveal specific areas in which the representation of the public 
interest should be strengthened. 
A. Presentation of the Staff Position in Commission Hearings 
Although the Commission staff prepares the financial exhibits 
and conducts the accounting and technical investigations on which 
it bases its position, the formal briefs and actual presentation before 
the Commission are made by an Assistant Attorney General operat-
68. During the hearings on S. 698, discussed in text accompanying notes 152-88 infra, 
Commission Chairman Willis F. Ward expressed serious reservations concerning the 
effectiveness of the Attorney General's intervention as well as concern that such inter-
vention has unduly extended the length of the hearings. Statement by Commissioner 
Ward, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
69. See note 153 infra. 
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ing out of the Public Service Division of the Attorney General's 
office. While the staff is comprised largely of engineers and accoun-
tants with a career specialization in utility regulation,70 the attorneys 
assigned to the Public Service Division of the Attorney General's 
office have no similar commitment to specialization in the regulatory 
field. During the past fifteen years, twelve different attorneys have 
been assigned to the Public Service Division. Of the ten attorneys 
who have subsequently left, four have entered private practice, five 
have been transferred to other divisions within the Attorney Gen-
eral's office, and one is presently on leave of absence.71 
Because of the complexity of rate cases, it takes a substantial 
period of time before attorneys assigned to the Public Service Divi-
sion become conversant in utility matters and are able to present 
adequately the staff position in Commission hearings.72 The presen-
tation of the staff case by inexperienced attorneys general is an im-
pediment to the optimal representation of the public interest.73 
In order to alleviate the problem caused by attorney turnover, the 
Commission should be permitted to employ a full-time attorney who 
would work with the staff in the preparation and presentation of the 
staff position in rate cases. Present statutory authority to appoint the 
staff "necessary for the proper exercise of the powers and duties of 
the commission"74 seems to embrace the retention of full-time 
counsel. Moreover, potential conflict with the duty of the Attorney 
General to provide the legal advice required by state departments 
and to act as legal counsel for state agencies may be minimized by 
limiting the staff attorney to activities connected with rate cases or 
other intra-agency proceedings.'15 The retention of counsel by a regu-
70. Letter from Tom Hancock, Director, Finance, Accounts and Valuation Division, 
to student author, March 7, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
71. Letter from Robert J. Taube, Assistant Attorney General, to student author, 
Feb. 7, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
72. The problem of attorney turnover and friction between staff members and in-
experienced attorneys has been noted in the context of rate proceedings in the FPC. 
See Cramton, THE CONDUCf OF RATE PROCEEDINGS IN THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION, 
Rfil><>RT OF A STUDY CONDUCTED BY THE COMMllTEE REPORTER OF THE ADllUNISTRATIVE 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES COMMllTEE ON RULEMAKING 33, 52 (1962). 
73. But see letter from Hugh Anderson to student author, March 2, 1972, at 2 [here• 
inafter Anderson letter, March 2], on file with the Michigan Law Review, where it is 
suggested that the turnover in the Public Service Division is not detrimental to the 
Commission because of the training period allowed newly assigned attorneys. Mr. An• 
derson notes that "at no time during the last 15 years • • • has the Commission ever 
been forced to rely upon an attorney with no previous public utility experience," Id. 
at 2. 
74. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.3 (1967). 
75. Assistant Attorney General Anderson notes that while there may be no consti• 
tutional objection to the employment of an attorney to represent the staff, "when it 
comes to representing the Commission in court, the position of this office for many 
years ••• has been that under the [Michigan] Constitution only the Attorney General 
has the right to speak for the State and its agencies." Anderson letter, March 2, srtpra 
note 73, at 2. 
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latory commission has precedent in the regulatory scheme of other 
states76 and would provide a solution to the high turnover that pres-
ently characterizes legal counsel available to the Commission. 
A competing consideration, however, should be noted. Assistant 
Attorneys General are, of course, ultimately responsible to the At-
torney General. By virtue of their independence from the Public 
Service Commission for promotions, recommendations, and assign-
ments, they are "in a position to serve as intermediaries from the 
staff, to the Commission, and as a buffer between the Commission 
and staff."77 It has been argued that counsel appointed by the At-
torney General is better able to exercise independent judgment than 
counsel retained by a regulatory commission.78 These considerations 
have merit, but the increased legal expertise in utility matters ob-
tainable through permanent staff counsel is of higher priority. While 
it would be possible for the Attorney General to make a commitment 
to employ and retain utility specialists in the Public Service Division, 
the more certain course is to institutionalize the utility attorney in 
the context of employment by the Public Service Commission. 
B. The Legal and Practical Status of the 
Commission Staff 
Although it is generally acknowledged by the Commission that 
its operations are "quasi-judicial in nature,"79 the precise relation-
ship between the staff and the Commission is not clearly defined in 
the Administrative Procedures Act, in the Commission's own Rules 
of Practice and Procedure, or by statute. While the Commission re-
gards the staff as a "party" to a rate case, the failure to define the 
status of the staff in more precise terms has led to uncertainty re-
garding staff powers and rights. As a result, the staff occupies the 
76. The Wisconsin experience is illustrative. William E. Torkelson has served as 
Chief Counsel of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission since 1949. Wisconsin Com-
missioner Arthur L. Padrutt believes that "effective regulation of public utilities in 
the public interest is much enhanced where a commission is able to retain its own 
counsel." Letter from Arthur L. Padrutt, Commissioner, Wis. Pub. Serv. Commn., to 
student author, March 20, 1972, at 3, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
77. Letter from Hugh B. Anderson to student author, May 22, 1972, on file with the 
Michigan Law Review. 
78. See comments by Joseph I. Lewis, Chief Counsel, Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission, 1961 Convention of the National Association of R.R. and Utilities Com-
missioners, Workshop on Public Utility Law, Sept. 28, 1961, at 554-60, on file with the 
Michigan Law Review. 
79. Memorandum from Dept. of Commerce to Governor Milliken (Pub. Serv. 
Commn. Analysis of S. 980), July 23, 1971, at 2 [hereinafter Analysis S. 980]. The analy-
sis was prepared by Commission Chairman Ward. When a bill is introduced in the 
Michigan legislature that would affect a state department if it were passed, the depart-
ment prepares an analysis of the bill which states the department's official position 
toward the bill. An analysis is often quite revealing since it states not only an official 
policy position but also frequently reveals the agency's conception of its role and duties 
to the public. 
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uncomfortable position of representing the public interest in Com-
mission hearings without rights equal to those of other parties to the 
proceedings. 
A rate case completed in 1971 illustrates the difficulty with the 
present concept of staff rights. The General Telephone CompanyBo 
had applied for a rate increase in 1970, and the case had been as-
signed to a hearing examiner to receive testimony and recommend 
a proposal for decision.Bl Use of a hearing examiner is expressly 
authorized by the Administrative Procedures Act, 82 and the role of 
the hearing examiner in the Michigan regulatory process has been 
expanded during the recent period of numerous rate petitions. The 
Act provides that the examiner's proposal for decision shall become 
the decision of the Commission unless exceptions are filed by a party 
adversely affected or the Commission initiates its own review.Ba 
In the hearings before Examiner Alfred Sullivan, the staff con-
centrated its case on the purchases that the General Telephone Com-
pany had made from the Automatic Electric Company.B4 Both the 
General Telephone Company and the Automatic Electric Company 
are wholly owned subsidiaries of the General Telephone & Elec-
tronics Corporation,85 and the staff argued that in determining the 
reasonableness of the prices charged by Automatic the only proper 
approach would be to "set a fair rate of return on common equity to 
be earned by Automatic Electric.''86 The hearing examiner rejected 
80. See Troxel, Telephone Regulation in Michigan, in UTILITY R.EcuLAnoN 141, 
145-56 (W. G. Shepherd & T. G. Gies ed. 1966). 
81. General Telephone Co., U-3798, Proposal for Decision, at 1 Oune 29, 1971), on 
file with the Michigan Law Review, 
82. MICH, COMP. LAws .ANN. § 24.279-281 (Supp. 1972). The Public Service Com• 
mission desires that "eventually all hearings be conducted by hearing e.xaminers, in• 
eluding all rate matters" and has sought an increase in the number of hearing examin• 
ers from three to five in fiscal 1972. MICH. Ptra. SERV. Co11n.rn., Budgetary Request, on 
file with the Michigan Law Review. Hearing Examiner Alfred A. Sullivan reports that 
Michigan has lagged far behind other industrial states in providing a substantial force 
of hearing examiners. Conversation between Examiner Sullivan and student author, 
April 18, 1972. 
83. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 24.281(3) (Supp. 1972). 
84. Brief of the Commission Staff at 3-8, General Telephone Co., U-3798 [herein-
after Commission brief]. 
85. General Telephone Co., 90 P.U.R.3d 228, 230 (l\:lich, Pub. Serv. Commn,, 1971). 
86. Commission brief, supra note 84, at 6. In the recently completed Michigan Bell 
case, Commissioner Ralls similarly argued that "the commission must treat both children 
of AT&T equally, particularly when all the treats go home to the same parent." Michi• 
gan Bell Telephone Co., U-3838, Opinion and Order of Mich, Pub. Serv, Commn., at 
8-9 (April 28, 1972) (dissenting opinion). The proper method of valuing equipment 
purchases from a commonly owned subsidiary has long been a perplexing regulatory 
issue. See Invin, The Communications Industry, in THE STRUCTIJRE OF AMERICAN IN• 
nusmY 404-06 (W. Adams ed., 4th ed. 1971). The California Public Utilities Commission 
has pursued the theory advocated by the Michigan Commission staff in the General 
Telephone case, but there are indications that the California Commission is reversing its 
stand. Lawson, supra note 4, at 22, col. 3. The California supreme court has recently 
June 1972] Comments 1383 
the staff's arguments and computed the rate base by using the actual 
prices paid by General Telephone87 since evidence had been offered 
that the prices charged "were identical to or lower than the prices 
charged to .•. nonaffiliated companies."88 Despite the rejection of 
its position, the Commission staff did not file an exception to the 
examiner's ruling. The failure to do so may be attributed to the 
uncertainty regarding staff rights to file exceptions which had been 
created by the then recently enacted Administrative Procedures Act. 
Under the Administrative Procedures Act, the right to file ex-
ceptions is granted only to "a party to the proceeding other than the 
agency itself."89 This seems to preclude the filing of exceptions by 
the staff. Even though the staff is regarded as an adversary party in 
the context of a rate case, there is no support for the proposition that 
it should be considered anything other than a part of the Commis-
sion for purposes of the prohibitory clause of the Act. The staff is 
certainly part of the Commission under the statutory framework of 
the Commission's authority. Obviously, to the extent that the staff 
is viewed merely as an arm of the Commission it is anomalous to 
allow it to file exceptions since it results in an agency challenging 
itself.00 But since the judicial model contemplates the staff as an 
adversary party with corresponding rights, to deny the staff full rights 
will prevent Commission consideration of potentially important 
questions that arise before hearing examiners and are resolved ad-
versely to the public. Because the Commission intends to expand the 
role of hearing examiners so that all hearings eventually will be 
conducted by examiners, 91 the lack of staff authority to file exceptions 
will take on increasing importance. 
The Administrative Procedures Act presently provides a route 
by which staff dissatisfaction with an examiner's decision may be 
communicated to the Commission. Although the Administrative 
Procedures Act generally prohibits communication between the 
agency decision-makers and the agency staff engaged in investigation 
and preparation of a given case during the pendency of that proceed-
annulled the Commission's order, relying in part on the failure to make an adjustment 
for purchases from a commonly owned subsidiary. See City of Los Angeles v. Public 
Utilities Commission, - Cal. 3d -, 497 P.2d 785, 793-96, 102 Cal. Rptr. 313, 321-24 
(1972). 
87. 90 P.U.R.3d at 231. 
88. Commission Brief, supra note 84, at 5. 
89. MICH. COMP, LAws ANN. § 24.281(1) (Supp. 1972). 
90. It is also not clear that the staff would qualify as a "party" under section 5 of 
the Administrative Procedures Act, MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 24.205(3) (Supp. 1972), 
even if it were regarded as separate from the Commission. Furthermore, the Commis-
sion's own rules provide no support for concluding that the Commission staff is in-
tended to be afforded party status. See MICH. ADMIN, C.R. 460.ll(c) &: .17 (Supp. 1968). 
91. See note 82 supra. 
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ing,92 the recent "Hancock Amendment" of the section specifically 
exempts the Public Service Commission from that prohibition.03 
While this safety valve, coupled with the Commission's right to re-
open an examiner's proposal for decision to full Commission review, 
may compensate for the staff's inability to file exceptions, it does so 
only at the expense of detraction from the Commission's avowed 
adherence to the judicial model. Ex parte communications between 
the staff and the Commission regarding the specifics of a rate case 
should be discouraged.94 As the Commission staff increases in size, 
the rationale of the "Hancock Amendment" no longer exists;0u 
that amendment should be repealed to restore the prohibition of 
communication between the staff and the Commission during rate 
cases. In its place, the staff should be given the statutory right to file 
exceptions to examiner proposals for decision. Considering the ex-
panded role destined for hearing examiners in Michigan, ultimate 
resort to the full Commission by the staff should be institutionally 
protected. 
An additional result of the failure to delineate precisely the 
powers of the staff is the inability of the staff to seek judicial review 
of Commission rulings. The Administrative Procedures Act provides 
92, MICH, COMP, LAws ANN.§ 24.282 (Supp. 1972). 
93. Mica. COMP, LAws ANN, § 24.282 (Supp. 1972). 
94. Off-the-record communications should also be prohibited because they could be 
used by the Commission or individual commissioners to influence the arguments made 
by the staff in rate cases. This raises the question whether separation of the staff from 
dependence upon the Commission might strengthen the regulatory process by eliminat-
ing even the possibility of interference by the Commission in the development of sub-
stantive issues by the staff. Such a separation would more fully effectuate the Commis-
sion's judicial model by creating a staff that was in every sense a "party" to rate pro-
ceedings. Such a proposal is likely to be counterproductive, however, because it over-
looks the wide range of activities presently performed by the staff that assists the 
Commission. Creation of a separate staff unit to consider rate cases would not obviate 
the necessity of a staff unit assigned to the Commission with responsibility for other 
necessary elements of utility regulation such as field work inspections, investigation of 
consumer complaints, and utility audits on a rotating basis. See generally Cramton, 
supra note 30, at 278-80. Perhaps more importantly, the Commission contemplates 
greater involvement in regulatory areas where the judicial model is inapplicable, and 
will require a large technical staff in order to evaluate investigations that arc not part 
of adversary proceedings. For example, in connection with the recent Detroit Edison 
case, the Commission ordered the company to submit a ten-year "comprehensive 
report" of projected load growth, power generation capacity, and pollution abatement 
plans. See Detroit Edison Co., U-3910 (Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm., March 30, &: April 10, 
1972) (Interim Rate Order &: Amendment to Interim Rate Order). See also note 64 
supra and accompanying text. Therefore, any attempt to isolate the staff from the 
Commission at the present time must be tempered by the realization that increasing 
the independence of the staff is likely to have the additional result of depriving the 
Commission of its staff at the moment of its greatest need. 
95. Tom Hancock, Director, Finance, Accounts and Valuation Division of the 
Commission, believes that the purpose of the amendment "was to ease the difficulty for 
a Commission having a relatively small technical staff." Mr. Hancock was not a party 
to the discussions that led to the amendment. Letter from Tom Hancock to student 
author, March 7, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
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for judicial review only for "person[s] ... aggrieved by a final deci-
sion or order"96 and yet defines "persons" so as to exclude the agency 
engaged in the particular case.97 Therefore, while utility companies 
may appeal Commission rulings, and have done so frequently,98 the 
staff is denied rights of appeal because of its relationship to the Com-
mission-even though it is regarded as an adversary party with the 
duty of representing the public interest in rate proceedings before 
the Commission. Providing staff access to judicial review, however, 
runs into practical and theoretical difficulties. Even if the staff were 
permitted to retain an attorney for intra-agency counsel, the Attorney 
General would object strongly to any attempt to broaden the duties 
of the staff attorney to include representation of the staff in judicial 
proceedings. Absent such an extension, any judicial challenge by 
the staff would find the Attorney General counseling the opposing 
parties.0° Furthermore, since the staff members are still ultimately 
dependent upon the Commissioners for assignments and advance-
ment, there is a practical incentive for the staff to avoid direct chal-
lenge of Commission rulings. 
Staff right to judicial review of Commission rulings is less com-
pelling than the right to file exceptions. The right to file exceptions 
is necessary to assure that the persons with the statutory duty to regu-
late utility rates, namely the Commissioners, do not abdicate their 
responsibility to hearing examiners. But when the Commission itself 
has made the decision, the statutory command has been fulfilled. 
The Public Service Commission will find it useful to consider the 
operations of other regulatory commissions which do permit judicial 
review for both parties to proceedings,100 but absent demonstration 
96. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 24.301 (Supp. 1972). While that section provides the 
right to review, the mechanics of review are provided in MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. 
§ 462.26 (1967). Although that statute, originally applicable to the old Railroad Com-
Inission, refers to common carriers, MlcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 460.4 (1967) applies it to 
Public Service Commission orders as well. 
97. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 24.205(4) (Supp. 1972). An important distinction must 
be drawn between the right of an agency to seek judicial review when its decision has 
been reversed by a lower court, and the situation presently under discussion, namely 
the ~ght of a component of an agency to seek judicial review not of a court decision, 
but rather of the administrative decision itself. In the former situation, judicial review 
has been permitted in Michigan despite the prevailing view that the term "person 
aggrieved" does not include bodies acting in the name of the state. Compare General 
Telephone Co. of Michigan v. Pub. Serv. Commn., 341 Mich. 620, 67 N.W .2d 822 (1954) 
with Davis, Standing of a Public Official To Challenge Agency Decisions: A Unique 
Problem of State Administrative Law, 16 AD. L. REv. 163, 176-77 (1964). 
98. E.g., General Telephone Co. of Michigan v. Pub. Serv. Commn., 341 Mich. 620, 
67 N.W .2d 882 (1954); Michigan Consolidated Gas Co. v. Pub. Serv. Commn., 25 Mich. 
App. 512, 181 N.W .2d 596, leave to appeal granted, 384 Mich. 783 (1970). 
99. Compare note 75 supra with Sax &: Conner, Michigan's Environmental Protec-
tion Act of 1970: A Progress Report, 70 MICH. L. REv. 1003, 1022 n.82 (1972). 
100. Maryland provides for the appointment of a People's Counsel who may retain 
experts, have full access to commission records and staff, and appear before the Com-
mission in any matter or proceeding "in which he may deem the public interest to be 
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of a more compelling need, the right to judicial review by the Com-
mission staff is not essential. 
C. Funding the Regulators 
Of all the barriers to adequate representation of the public in-
terest in rate proceedings, none is more formidable than the inade-
quacy of funds available to the Commission and its staff. The Detroit 
Free Press study found that some states regulating comparable utility 
operations had larger regulatory staffs than the Michigan Public Ser-
vice Commission.101 Under orders from Michigan Governor William 
G. Milliken,102 the Administrative Section of the Public Service 
Commission has attempted to estimate the allocation of the Com-
mission's budget for fiscal 1971 according to function performed. 
The Program Budget Evaluation System reveals that approximately 
544 thousand dollars of the Commission budget will be devoted to 
the regulation of utility rates.103 When the resources available to the 
staff are compared with the expenditures that have been made by the 
state's major utilities in connection with rate cases, the result is very 
plainly what the Detroit Free Press characterized as an "unequal 
contest."104 In connection with a single 1970 rate case10G in which 
Detroit Edison sought a forty-eight million dollar increase, the com-
pany reportedly spent 660 thousand dollars.106 
The statutory provisions relating to the funding of the Public 
Service Commission are, like those delineating the Commission's 
authority, 107 a conglomeration of statutes passed at different times 
to govern the Public Service Commission, the Public Utilities Com-
involved •••• " Mo. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 15 (1969). The People's Counsel is given the 
right to judicial review. Mo. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 90 (Supp. 1971). 
101. Cooper, June 6, supra note 6, at 8-A, cols. 5-8. See also FPC, FEDERAL AND STATE 
COMMISSION JURISDICTION AND REGULATION 44 (1967). FPC figures reveal that the follow-
ing states have larger professional staffs than the Michigan Public Service Commission: 
California, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. The following states 
maintain a larger "total staff" than Michigan: Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, 
Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
102. See 1971-1 ExECUTIVE DIRECTIVE, February 16, 1971, from Governor William G. 
Milliken to Principal Department Heads, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
103. Conversations between :Bert Schafer, Supervisor, Administrative Section, Public 
Utilities Division, and student author, Feb. 3, 1972 &: April 18, 1972. The proposed 
budget for fiscal 1972 would increase the resources devoted to rate regulation to 710 
thousand dollars but is based on the assumption that S. 698, discussed in notes 152-89 
infra and accompanying text, is passed. 
104. Cooper, June 6, supra note 6, at 8-A, col. 5. 
105. Detroit Edison Co., 83 P.U.R.3d 463 (Mich. Pub. Scrv. Commn., 1970). 
106. Documentation of Edison expenditures is provided in Detroit Edison Co,, 
U-3697, Order of Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., Exhibit I-50 (April 22, 1970), on file with 
the Michigan Law Rwiew. See also Anderson letter, Feb, 15, supra note 38, at 4, 
107. See text accompanying notes 13-20 supra. 
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mission,108 and the Railroad Commission.100 Although granted wide 
authority to appoint a staff "as shall be necessary for the proper 
exercise of the powers and duties of the commission,"110 the Com-
mission ultimately depends on the annual state appropriation as the 
source of spending authority. Until the recent plethora of rate cases, 
the Commission was an agency of low visibility and consequently 
did not rate high in the hierarchy of appropriations priorities. Al-
though the Commission now receives substantial public scrutiny and 
interest, the State of Michigan is having difficulty balancing its 
budget and the resulting squeeze has been felt by all state depart-
ments.111 
The "Expenses of Audit or Appraisal" statute passed originally 
for the Public Utilities Commission affords a mechanism by which 
the Public Service Commission may escape its financial straitjacket.112 
Passed in 1921, the statute is still basically operative in its original 
form.113 This statute has been the target of a number of current 
legislative amendments directed toward providing a more equitable 
funding allocation for the staff and even raising the possibility of 
forcing utility companies to pay the expenses incurred by inter-
venors. Two important issues are raised by the present statutes and 
the attempts to amend them: (I) What is the scope of staff activities 
that may be presently and properly charged to the utility companies, 
and (2) does an expansion of the scope of permissible charges equal-
108. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967). 
109. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.556 (1967). 
110. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.3 (1967). 
111. Departments were told to expect an order to cut back expenses in fiscal 1971 
by 3%. Conversation with Bert Schafer, supra note 103. 
112. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967). 
113. The statute, MICH. Cor.n>. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967), provides: 
460.401 Expenses of audit or appraisal by utilities 
commission; account 
Sec. 1. Whenever the Michigan public utilities commission finds it to be neces-
sary to audit the books and records, or to appraise the plants, properties or facilities 
of any telephone, gas, electric light, and power, electric railway, water, heat or any 
other public utility under the jurisdiction of said commission for rate making, 
capitalization, or any other purpose, it shall have the right to make such audit and 
appraisal through its accounting, engineering and other forces, and shall keep an 
accurate, detailed account of all moneys expended and expenses incurred by said 
commission in and about such audit and appraisal. 
460.402 Same; payment 
Sec. 2. From time to time during the progress of the audit and appraisal, or 
at the conclusion of the same, said commission shall render to the utility in ques-
tion, statements showing the amounts of money expended in such work, which 
expense shall be paid by such utility into the state treasury at such times and in 
such manner as the commission may by order require. 
460.403 Audit or appraisal; disposition of receipts for expenses 
Sec. 3. All moneys paid into the state treasury by arty public utility uµ.der the 
provisions of this act shall be credited to the general fund. 
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ize the funds available to the staff and discourage unnecessary com-
pany expenditures? · 
A majority of states require that a portion or all of the costs of 
regulation of utilities be provided by special fees or assessments paid 
by the utility companies being regulated.114 The rationale for such 
provisions is appealing. When a utility company pays the costs of 
regulation, the expenditures increase its cost of service and, accord-
ingly, constitute proper items in the calculation of allowable utility 
rates. Since the costs of regulation are eventually reflected in the level 
of utility rates approved by the Commission, the utility customers 
ultimately bear these costs. Therefore, the beneficiaries of the regu-
latory process-the rate-paying customers-underwrite the costs of 
regulation.115 
In 1965 the Public Service Commission requested an interpreta-
tion of the Expenses of Audit or Appraisal statute116 from the At-
torney General.117 In connection with that request, the Commission 
staff prepared a memorandum summarizing its interpretation of the 
statute and the precise activities for which expenses were being 
assessed. Although that formal interpretation was never issued, there 
are indications that the file has remained active, and the Commission 
has renewed its request.118 
The staff memorandum119 indicates that field and office work in 
connection with formal rate proceedings are ordinarily charged to 
the appropriate utility. Except for additional work unconnected with 
formal rate cases but nevertheless financially oriented (such as orig-
inal cost audits, reviews of depreciation studies, and inventories of 
property), the staff has not attempted to charge expenses to utili-
ties.120 The staff and the Commission are of the opinion that any 
114. FPC, supra note 101, at 45-46. 
115. Compare with a letter from Richard Guregian, Director of Ta.xes, Real Estate 
and Diversification, Detroit, Toledo &: Ironton Railroad Co., to State Senator Harry A. 
DeMaso, Feb. 9, 1972, at I [hereinafter Guregian letter]: 
The Public Service Commission was established as the "watchdog" over public 
utilities and to protect (?) the public's interest. It should logically follow that the 
public at large (of which the utilities are a member) should undenvritc the cost, 
The utilities are liable for all the same taxes to which other business entities arc 
subject and bear their share of the economic burden of providing government and 
are, therefore, paying their share of the cost of being regulated. 
On file with the Michigan Law Review. 
116. MICH. COl',IP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967). 
117. Letter from Peter B. Spivak, Chairman, Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn., to Frank J, 
Kelley, Attorney General, June 8, 1965, on file with the Michigan Law Review, 
118. Conversation between William R. Ralls, Commr., Mich. Pub. Serv. Commn,, 
and student author, Feb. 15, 1972. 
119. Memorandum from F. M. Hoppe, Director of Public Utilities, to the Mich, 
Pub. Serv. Commn., Public Utilities Division and Charges to Public Utilities, June 8, 
1965 (hereinafter Staff Memo], on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
120. Id. at 2-5. No charge is made for investigation of complaints, safety checks, field 
checks of construction and operation of gas facilities, general studies of a utility indus-
try, negotiation to reduce customer rates, and/or continuing checks to determine utility 
compliance with regulations and rules of the Commission, 
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attempt to broaden the assessments into other areas such as investiga-
tion of customer complaints, compliance with safety codes, or Com-
mission studies of particular utility industries might lead to company 
demands for formal hearings that could effectively bring regulation 
to a "standstill."121 In the fiscal years ending in 1970 and 1971 the 
Commission assessed the state's utilities a total of 306,549 dollars.122 
Section 1 of the Expenses of Audit or Appraisal provision123 is 
capable of a broader reading, principally because of the ambiguity 
of the word "appraisal." The term may have been intended in its 
evaluative sense which would permit, for example, Commission-
sponsored studies of utility industries or pollution abatement. Cou-
pled with the use of the term "audit" in the statute, however, ap-
praisal is probably intended in its financial sense to embrace valua-
tion of utility property and depreciation studies. The Commission's 
interpretation of the statute as not authorizing assessments for cus-
tomer complaint investigation, safety-code compliance checks, and 
the above-mentioned industry-wide studies is consistent with the 
probable legislative intent. Therefore, although Commission author-
ity to assess expenses is not limited to expenses related solely to 
formal rate proceedings, it clearly does not embrace the entire scope 
of regulatory work conducted by the staff. Perhaps more importantly, 
there is no mechanism in the assessment statutes that serves to dis-
courage exorbitant company expenditures in connection with rate 
cases; in fact, the opposite may be true: knowing that the staff has 
only limited access to funds and resources, a utility company has an 
incentive to "overkill" in the retention of experts and specialists to 
convince the Commission of the need for rate increases. 
No authority presently exists by which the utility companies may 
be compelled to pay expenses incurred by any person or group other 
than the Public Service Commission. Costs of investigations under-
taken by intervenors, including the Attorney General, must be paid 
by the intervenors themselves. 
Given the Commission's interpretation of the Expenses of Audit 
121. Id. at 1; Spivak letter, supra note 117, at 1. The Commission's fear may be 
unwarranted; see text accompanying notes 169-87 infra. 
122. Aggregate expenses charged to utility companies over the past five years: 
Fiscal Year Pub. Serv. Commn. 
Ending 6/30 Employees Contractual Total 
1967 $ 36,052 $ 36,052 
1968 52,901 52,901 
1969 38,903 $ 18,831 57,734 
1970 126,963 21,571 148,534 
1971 138,811 19,204 158,015 
Source of data: Letter from Commissioner William R. Ralls to student author, March 
16, 1972, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
123, MICH, COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.401 (1967). 
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or Appraisal statute,124 it is important and appropriate to consider 
two bills pending in the Michigan legislature that would substan-
tially alter the scope and method of funding Commission activities. 
I. Senate Bill 980 
S. 980125 was introduced in July 1971 and would amend the Ex-
penses of Audit or Appraisal statute,126 discussed above, by providing 
that the Commission shall have the right to "make economic or 
:financial studies"127 of any utility under its jurisdiction in addition 
to retaining its authority to make audits and appraisals of utility 
124. Mica. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967). 
125. S. 980, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971). The bill would amend MICH, ColllP, 
I.Aws ANN.§§ 460.401-.402, set forth in note 113 supra, to read as below, The capitalized 
words presently do not appear in §§ 460.401-.402 but would be added by the new bill, 
For the deletions in §§ 460.401-.402 proposed by S. 980, compare note 113 supra. 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT: 
Section I. Sections 1 and 2 of Act No. 47 of the Public Acts of 1921, being sec• 
tions 460.401 and 460.402 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, are amended to read as 
follows: 
Sec. 1. (I) Whenever the public SERVICE commission finds it to be necessary to 
audit the books and records, or to appraise the plants, properties or facilities, OR 
MAKE ECONOMIC OR FINANCIAL STUDIBS of any telephone, gas, electric 
light and power, electric railway, water, heat or any other public utility under the 
jurisdiction of THE commission for rate making, capitalization or any other pur• 
pose, it shall have the right to make THE audit, appraisal OR STUDY through its 
accounting, ECONOMIC engineering OR other forces EMPLOYED OR RE· 
TAINED BY IT. THE COMMISSION shall keep an accurate, detailed account 
of all FEES PAID, moneys expended and c.xpenses incuned in THE audit, ap• 
praisal OR STUDY. 
(2) UPON AUTHORIZATION OF THE COMMISSION, AN INTERVENING 
PARTY MAY EMPLOY ENGINEERS, ACCOUNTANTS, ECONOMISTS AND 
OTHER NECESSARY PERSONS TO AUDIT, APPRAISE AND ANALYZE THE 
BOOKS, RECORDS, STATISTICS AND FACILITIES OF A PUBLIC UTILITY 
COMPANY, AND TO PRESENT EVIDENCE TO THE COMMISSION IN A 
PROCEEDING INVOLVING THE RATES OR SERVICES OF THE UTILITY 
COMPANY. 
(3) AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO 1/20 OF 1% OF THE GROSS UTILITY REV• 
ENUES OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY COMPANY BEING INVESTIGATED, 
BASED UPON THE COMPANY'S REVENUES FOR THE CALENDAR OR 
FISCAL YEAR LAST COMPLETED, SHALL BE AVAILABLE FOR USE OF 
THE COMMISSION AND AUTHORIZED INTERVENERS AS PROVIDED IN 
THIS ACT. 
Sec. 2. From time to time during the progress OR AT THE CONCLUSION of 
the audit, appraisal, STUDY OR TESTIMONY, THE commission OR AUTHOR· 
IZED INTERVENERS shall render to the utility in question, statements showing 
the amounts of money expended in THE work. IN THE CASE OF COMMISSION 
EXPENSES, PAYMENT shall be MADE by THE utility into the state treasury, 
AND IN THE CASE OF THE EXPENSES OF AUTHORIZED INTERVENERS, 
DIRECTLY TO THE ACCOUNTANTS, ENGINEERS, ECONOMISTS OR 
OTHER PERSONS EMPLOYED BY THE INTERVENERS, at THE times and in 
THE manner as the commission may by order require. IF A UTILITY HAS ANY 
OBJECTION TO THE NECESSITY OR AMOUNT OF THE EXPENSES, IT 
SHALL FILE ITS OBJECTIONS WITH THE COMMISSION WITHIN 30 
DAYS AFTER BEING PRESENTED WITH THE STATEMENT OF EXPENSES, 
AND THE COMMISSION SHALL PROMPTLY HOLD A HEARING ON THE 
OBJECTIONS. 
126. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967). 
127. S. 980, § 1(1), 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971). 
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records and facilities. The bill specifies that these audits, appraisals, 
or studies may be made by personnel "employed or retained by"128 
the Commission. Senator Plawecki, a co-sponsor of the bill, believes 
that the Commission has been hesitant to retain outside experts in 
connection with rate proceedings because of the uncertain authority 
provided by section I 129 of the current Expenses of Audit or Ap-
praisal statute.13° Feeling that the retention of outside experts would 
strengthen the presentation of the staff's case in Commission pro-
ceedings, he also notes that the use of experts would give staff mem-
bers additional time to pursue their regular duties since they would 
not be called upon to testify in numerous hearings.131 While the 
sponsors' theories regarding the benefits from greater reliance on 
specialists in rate cases appear sound, the bill would merely confirm 
the authority that the Commission presently exercises.132 
However, to the extent that the Commission contemplates resort-
ing to outside experts in connection with environmental matters or 
utility industry studies, S. 980 would release the Commission from 
having to justify assessments in terms of "audits" or "appraisals" as 
is presently required.133 Therefore, despite the fact that the bill was 
designed to make experts accessible for rate case purposes, the 
broader impact of the bill would be to allow the Commission to 
retain experts to do the precise kinds of investigations and analyses 
that the Commission will require in subsequent years. 
S. 980 also attempts to solve the very difficult problem of securing 
adequate funds for intervenors, thereby providing for broadened 
public participation in rate proceedings. Upon authorization by the 
Commission, an intervenor would be permitted to employ specialists 
to present evidence in Commission proceedings. The bill provides 
that an amount equal to one-t\\Tentieth of one per cent of the gross 
utility revenues of the company being investigated would be avail-
able to the authorized intervenors and the Commission.134 Although 
payments for Commission expenditures would continue to be made 
directly to the state treasury under section 2 of the proposed bil1136 
and credited to the general fund under section 3 of the current Ex-
penses of Audit or Appraisal statute,136 payments would be made 
128. S. 980, § 1(1), 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971). 
129. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.401 (1967). 
130. Conversation between State Senator David Plawecki and student author, Feb. 
3, 1972. 
131. Id. 
132. In recent years, the Commission has retained outside specialists and assessed 
the utility companies for those expenses. See note 122 supra. 
133. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.401 (1967). 
134. S. 980, § 1(3), 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971). 
135. S. 980, § 2, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971). 
136. MICH. Coi.IP. LAws ANN. § 460.403 (1967). 
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directly to the experts employed by the intervenors under the pro-
posed legislation.1a1 
The Public Service Commission opposes S. 980.138 The bill not 
only imposes a ceiling of one-twentieth of one per cent of gross utility 
revenues, but it also provides that the ceiling shall apply to the sum 
of the charges assessable by the intervenor and the Commission.130 
Despite the fact that the bill vests the Commission with the ultimate 
authority to regulate the level of intervenor spending, the imposition 
of a fl.at percentage ceiling on the amount that may be assessed 
constitutes a restriction not presently found in the statute. The 
percentage ceiling, as a function of a company's revenues, might be 
inadequate to cover the expenses related to small and medium-sized 
utilities.140 The ceiling also fails to offer any incentive for reduced 
company expenditures in connection with rate cases. Application of 
the ceiling to Detroit Edison would limit assessments to about 250 
thousand dollars,141 which £alls far short of the sums that Edison has 
spent in recent rate cases.142 The Commission opposes any bill that 
contemplates funding intervenors unless such funding provisions are 
"entirely separate and apart from any statute funding operation of 
the Commission and its staff."148 This position is sound. 
Intervenors can and do have an impact on the regulatory pro-
cess. The City of Detroit and the UAW have successfully challenged 
utility advertising policies.144 The Consumer Alliance suit and its 
presentation of expert testimony145 on the structure of utility rates 
has already had an impact on Commission decision-making. Inter-
vention by environmental groups has led to settlement of disputes 
arising from the construction of a nuclear power plant by Consumers 
Power Company.146 All of these developments indicate that there is 
a valuable contribution that intervenors can make in the rate deter-
mination process in Michigan as a supplement to the Commission 
staff. The uncertainty of funding for intervenors, however, offers a 
serious challenge to their ability to provide this valuable contribution; 
but there are methods available to finance intervenors without dilut-
137. S. 980 § 2, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971). 
138. Analysis S. 980, supra note 79, at 2. 
139. S. 980, § 1(3), 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1971), 
140. Analysis S. 980, supra note 79, at 2. 
141. This calculation was made by talcing one twentieth of one per cent of 518,632,· 
000 dollars, Detroit Edison's total electric revenues for 1969. 1970 DETROIT EDISON Co • 
.ANN. REP. 
142. See text accompanying note 106 infra. 
143. Analysis S. 980, supra note 79, at 3. 
144. See text accompanying notes 50-56 supra. 
145. See notes 61-64 supra and accompanying text, 
146. Palisades Plant Settlement Agreement between Intervenors and Consumers 
Power Co., No. 50-255 (A.E.C., March 12, 1971), on file with the Environmental Law 
Society, University of Michigan. 
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ing the resources available to the Commission staff.147 The principle 
of S. 980, namely Commission authorization of intervenor expen-
ditures and subsequent assessment of utility companies, is certainly 
a plausible method. Since expenses paid by the utility companies will 
ultimately be passed along in the form of higher utility rates, there 
is no drain on the utilities, absent abnormal regulatory lag.148 Al-
though the Public Service Commission opposes S. 980 because it 
might encourage an "extreme degree of intervention,"149 the Com-
mission could control the number of intervenors and the level of 
permissible expenditures. The deficiency of S. 980 in its present form 
is not that it provides funding for intervenors, but rather that it does 
so only at the expense of the Commission staff.159 
Most significantly, S. 980 fails to modify the Commission's de-
pendence on the annual appropriations by the legislature. The 
Commission's powers to appoint the necessary staff are rendered im-
potent by the present reliance on the legislature. Even the Commis-
sion expenditures that impose no drain on the state treasury-those 
expenses that are assessed to the utility companies-are not within 
the control of the Commission because the funds are deposited in the 
general fund of the state treasury.151 This leaves the utility companies 
with the continued incentive to spend lavishly in preparation of rate 
cases and to lobby to keep the annual appropriation to the Public 
Service Commission minimal. 
Despite the welcome expansion of the scope of assessable charges 
that S. 980 provides, passage in its present form might prove detri-
mental to the public interest. 
2. Senate Bill 698 
Recently passed by the Michigan Senate is a bill that was intro-
duced at the request of the Public Service Commission,152 and has 
147. See Cramton, supra note 66, at 54046. 
148. See note 153 infra. 
149. Analysis S. 980, supra note 79, at 2. 
150, The issue of adequacy of funding for public interest intervenors is the primary 
hurdle currently preventing strong public interest representation. "[T)he leaders of the 
public interest movement, having won the early battles to secure the right to intervene, 
have discovered that some harsh economic realities threaten to make these early vic-
tories empty ones." Cramton, supra note 66, at 526. S. 980, by raising the possibility of 
utility payment of intervenor expenses, raises a potentially far-reaching solution which 
merits independent analysis. 
151. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.403 (1967). 
152. Memoranda from Dept. of Commerce to Governor Milliken (Pub. Serv. Commn. 
Analysis of S. 698), June 21, 1971 [hereinafter Analysis S. 698, June 21, 1971] &: March 
14, 1972. S. 698, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972), as amended and passed by the Senate 
on June 1, 1972 [hereinafter S. 698) provides: 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN ENACT: 
Sec. 1. As used in this act: 
(a) "Commission" means the public service commission. 
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(b) "Department" means the Department of Commerce. 
(c) "Puolic utility" means a steam, heat, electric, power, gas, water, telephone, 
telegraph, communications, pipeline or gas producing company regulated oy the 
commission, whether private, corporate or cooperative, except a municipally owned 
utility. 
Sec. 2. (1) The department within 30 days after the enactment into law of any 
appropriation to it, shall ascertain the amount of the appropriation attributable 
to the regulation of public utilities. This amount shall be assessed against the public 
utilities and shall be apportioned amongst them as follows: the gross revenue for 
the preceding calendar year derived from intrastate operations for each public 
utility shall be totaled and each public utility shall pay a portion of the assessment 
in the same proportion that its gross revenue for the preceding calendar year 
derived from intrastate operations bears to such total. Each public utility shall 
pay a minimum assessment of not less than $50.00. 
Sec. 3. For the fiscal year commencing July I, 1973 and annually thereafter, 
there shall be deducted from any amount to be assessed under section 2 an amount 
equal to the difference by which the actual ex:eenditures for the previous fiscal year 
attributable to the regulation of public utilities are less than the amounts appro• 
priated for those purposes, Such deductions shall be made in the same proportion as 
the original assessments in section 2 of the act. 
Sec. 4. For the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1972 and annually thereafter, each 
public utility shall be allowed a credit, not to exceed the amount of the assessment, 
for any fees paid during the previous fiscal year under Act No. 419 of the Public 
Acts of 1919, as amended, being sections 460.51 to 460.62 of the Compiled Laws of 
1948 and Act No. 47 of the Public Acts of 1921, being sections 460.401 to 460.403 of 
the Compiled Laws of 1948. If a credit exceeds the amount of the assessment the 
difference shall be credited to the general fund. Funds paid into the state treasury 
under the provisions of Act No. 419 of the Public Acts of 1919 and Act No. 47 of 
the Public Acts of 1921 shall be credited to a special account to finance the cost 
of Jmblic utility regulation. 
Sec. 5. All moneys paid into the state treasurr. by a public utility under this act 
shall be credited to a special account, to be utilized solely to finance the cost of 
regulating public utilities. 
Sec. 6. Within 15 days after the receipt of any statement of amount assessed 
under this act, the public utility may file with the commission objections setting 
forth in detail the grounds upon which the assessment is claimed to be excessive, 
erroneous, unlawful or invalid. The commission, after notice to the utility, shall 
hold a hearing on the objections. If, after hearing, the commission finds the assess-
ment is not excessive, erroneous, unlawful or invalid in whole or in part, it shall 
record its findings and transmit them to the public utility and again mail or serve 
a copy of the assessment upon the utility. Statements of assessment to which ob-
jections have not been filed, and statements of assessment and amended statements 
of assessment mailed or served after a hearing upon objections shall be paid not 
later than 30 days after their receipt. Assessments not paid when due shall bear 
interest at the rate of 1% per month. Statements of unpaid assessments together 
with interest thereon shall be recovered by the attorney general by appropriate 
action. 
Sec. 7. A suit or proceeding shall not be maintained in a court for the purpose 
of restraining or delaying the collection or payment of an assessment made under 
this act. A person or corporation making a payment under this act, believing the 
amount to be excessive, erroneous, unlawful or invalid may file a statement of 
claim with the court of claims. In an action for recovery of a payment made under 
this act, the claimant may raise every relevant issue of law and fact, evidenced 
by the record made before the commission. The court of claims may review ques-
tions of law and fact involved in a final decision or determination of the commis• 
sion made under this act. The procedure providing for the determination of the 
lawfulness of assessments and the recovery of payments made under this act shall 
be exclusive of all other remedies and procedures. 
Sec. 8. The commission may exempt a public utility from this act, if, after notice 
and hearing, it determines that gross revenues derived from intrastate operations 
is not a fair or equitable basis for assessing the costs of regulating that public 
utility and prescribes a fair and equitable manner for assessing such costs of regu-
lation. 
Sec. 9. Any public utility over which the commission has jurisdiction solely 
pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 9 of the Public Acts of 1929, as amended, 
being sections 483.101 to 483.120 of the Compiled Laws of 1948 or Act No. 16 of the 
Public Acts of 1929, as amended, being sections 483.1 to 483,11 of the Compiled 
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the conditional support of a number of the state's major utilities.153 
S. 698, although not purporting to free the Commission from reliance 
on the appropriations process, nevertheless has the potential to allow 
the Commission significant discretion in determining the level of 
expenditures for the regulation of the state's public utilities. 
The bill provides that within thirty days of any legislative ap-
propriation to the Department of Commerce, the Department shall 
determine the "amount of the appropriation attributable to the 
regulation of public utilities"154 and assess that amount against the 
public utilities of the state according to a formula based on gross 
revenue. The utility companies must pay the assessment within thirty 
days after receipt of the statement of the assessment155 or file objec-
tions with the Commission.156 If objections are filed, the Commission 
must hold a hearing after which the utility companies shall pay the 
amount determined by the Commission to be properly assessable.157 
Appeal may be taken from the Commission decision to the court of 
claims but no proceeding shall be maintained for the "purpose of 
restraining or delaying the collection or payment of an assessment."158 
In its original form, S. 698 provided that all moneys paid by a public 
utility would be credited to the general fund,159 but an amendment 
to the bill adopted by the Senate provides that funds assessed and 
Laws of 1948, or Act No. 144 of the Public Acts of 1909 as amended, being sections 
460.301 to 460.303 of the Compiled Laws of 1948, shall pay fees as prescribed by the 
commission in lieu of any assessment under the provisions of this act. 
Sec. IO. This act shall take effect July I, 1972. 
153. S. 698 is being considered in conjunction with S. 699, which was passed by the 
:Michigan Senate on May 2, 1972. S. 699 allows utility companies to implement rate in• 
creases without prior Commission approval if the Commission has failed to act upon 
a request for a rate increase within ten months. Such rate increases could be ordered 
reversed if Commission hearings found them to be unwarranted, and provisions are 
made for bonding and refunds. Detroit Free Press, May 3, 1972, at 4-A, col. 1. Similar 
processes are employed by other states; see Cramton, supra note 30, at 268-69, and IowA 
CODE .ANN. § 490A.6 (Supp. 1972). The utilities strongly supported S. 699 because it 
will alleviate the financial hardships imposed by regulatory lag. Because utility rates are 
determined on the basis of a recently completed test year and the process of formal 
hearings may be quite lengthy, during a period of rising costs a utility may earn less 
than its allowable rate of return. By hastening the implementation of higher rates, 
utility companies minimize the impact of regulatory lag. Recognizing that consumer 
interests would object to S. 699, the utility companies have supported S. 698 as a 
method of alleviating rate case backlog. See Comments of Robert W. Hartw'Cll, Execu-
tive Vice President for Finance, Detroit Edison Co., and Lloyd J. Haynes, Vice President, 
Michigan Bell Telephone Co., Hearings on S. 698, Before the Senate Comm. on Taxation 
and Veterans' Affairs, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess., March 14, 1972, on file with the Michi-
gan I.Aw Review. 
154. S. 698, § 2(1), 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972). 
155. S. 698, § 6, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972). 
156. S. 698, § 6, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess, (1972). 
157. S. 698, § 6, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972). 
158. S. 698, § 7, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972). 
159. S. 698, § 5, as introduced, provided that "All moneys paid into the state treasury 
by a public utility ••• shall be credited to the general fund." 
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collected must be earmarked "to be utilized solely to finance the 
cost of regulating public utilities."160 
Unfortunately, S. 698 does not define with precision the terms 
"regulation of public utilities"161 so that disputes regarding the in-
terpretation of that clause may arise. While the clause clearly con-
templates direct costs such as the salaries and expenses of the Public 
Utilities Division and the Finance, Accounts and Valuation Division, 
the most recent appropriation to the Department of Commerce in-
cludes many additional items that are indirectly, albeit indispens-
ably, associated with the "regulation of public utilities." These items 
include provisions for longevity and insurance, retirement, equip-
ment, and contractual services and materials.162 Appropriations for 
these expenditures, as well as a pro rata assessment for the salaries 
and expenses of the Public Service Commissioners and their staff, 
should be included in the assessment calculation. Since the Michigan 
legislature does not retain reports of committee hearings nor tran-
scripts of floor debate, a premium is put on clear, unambiguous 
drafting. Therefore, S. 698 should be amended to provide more 
precisely the expenditures contemplated by the assessment provision. 
Even in the absence of more precise statutory delineation, a broad 
interpretation is consistent with the argument that the "customers 
served by such [utilities] who receive the benefits of state regulation 
would pay the cost, rather than the general tax payers of the state."1611 
The utility companies are protected against a variance between 
the annual appropriations on which the assessment is based and 
actual Commission expenditures. Section 3 of S. 698164 provides that 
the Commission must deduct from the assessment in the subsequent 
fiscal year the am9unt by which the sum appropriated in the current 
year exceeded actual expenditures. Apparently designed to prevent 
double assessment, section 4 of the bill160 provides that utility com-
panies shall receive a credit against their annual assessment for any 
amounts paid to the state under sections 1-3 of the Expenses of Audit 
or Appraisal statute166 and sections 1-12 of the Public Utilities Com-
mission Act of 1919.167 However, once S. 698 is passed, there is no 
necessity for charging expenses to any specific company under exist-
ing statutes since the total appropriation for "regulation of public 
utilities" will have been assessed under the provisions of S. 698. 
160. 80 Mich. S.J. 1324, 1332 (1972). 
161. S. 698, § 2(1), 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972). 
162. No. 130, [1971] Mich. Acts 10-11. 
163. Analysis S. 698, June 21, 1971, supra note 152, at 2. 
164. S. 698, § 3, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972). 
165. S. 698, § 4, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972). 
166. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 (1967). 
167. MICH, COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.51-.62 (1967). 
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Therefore, the Expenses of Audit or Appraisal provisions and the 
relevant section of the Public Utilities Commission Act of 1919 should 
be specifically repealed concurrently with the passage of S. 698.168 The 
failure to repeal outdated and useless statutes relating to utility regu-
lation has been a characteristic of the Michigan legislature since the 
days of the Railroad Commission. The consideration of S. 698 is a 
good opportunity to clean up the statutes. 
Section 6 of S. 698169 would give the utility companies a statutory 
right to a hearing if they filed timely objections to the assessment. 
Given the Commission's interpretation of the Expenses of Audit or 
Appraisal law,170 it might appear that this section merely codifies 
existing law. It is contended, however, that this section of S. 698 is 
a significant modification of existing rights that works to the detri-
ment of the Public Service Commission. The Commission's inter-
pretation of the right of utility companies to compel a hearing when 
charges are assessed is based on a 1935 Michigan supreme court de-
cision.171 The Michigan Public Utilities Commission had ordered 
an appraisal and audit of Consumers Power Company to determine 
the reasonableness of the company's gas and electric rates. At that. 
time the "company as a whole ha[d] never been subjected to investi-
gation on the part of this Commission .... "172 The Michigan su-
preme court held that the Commission "had no jurisdiction to make 
the order appealed from without notice to the parties affected by the 
complaints made to it."173 
That case is distinguishable from assessments that would be made 
under S. 698 and that have been made under section 1 of the Ex-
penses of Audit or Appraisal statute.174 The audit and appraisal 
ordered in the Consumers Power case were made pursuant to what 
is now section 6 of the Transmission Electricity Act175 and the court 
based its holding on the specific language of the statute which pro-
vides: 
Said commission shall also have power, in connection with any rate 
or service hearing or investigation, to make such audit and analysis 
168. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 460.401-.403 and 460.61 (1967) respectively. Although 
not mentioned in S. 698, MlcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 460.556 should also be repealed in 
so far as it relates to assessments for audits. Failure to repeal that provision has caused 
confusion regarding the right of utility companies to demand a hearing before paying 
assessed charges. See notes 170-78 infra and accompanying text. 
169. S. 698, § 6, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972). 
170. See text accompanying note 121 supra. 
171. Consumers Power Co. v. Michigan Pub. Utilities Commn., 273 Mich. 184, 262 
N.W. 664 (1935). 
172. 273 Mich. at 185 n.•, 262 N.W. at 665 n.•. 
173. 273 Mich. at 187-88, 262 N.W. at 664. 
174. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 460.401 (1967). 
175. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.556 (1967). 
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. . • and said utility shall pay into the treasury of the state tl1e 
amount of such expense ••• .176 
The court said that "[t]he power conferred upon the commission is 
'in connection ·with any rate or service hearing or investigation.' It 
seems clear that the necessity therefor must be found to exist at a 
'hearing or investigation .•. .' "177 Since neither the current Expenses 
of Audit or Appraisal provision178 or S. 698 contains similar limiting 
language, it is inappropriate to conclude that absent a statutory right 
to a hearing the utility companies have that right under state deci-
sional law. 
Since Senate bill 699 provides that the Commission must act 
within a fixed time period or increased rates will automatically take 
effect,179 giving utility companies a statutory right to compel hearings 
might lead to its use to frustrate timely Commission consideration 
of rate applications. Unlike section I of the Expenses of Audit or 
Appraisal statute,180 which contains subjective terms that might be 
misinterpreted, S. 698 contemplates assessments based on the objec-
tive criteria of amount of state appropriations, and thereby mini-
mizes the possibility that the Commission might exceed its authority 
in calculating assessments. Since utility companies would have the 
ultimate resort to judicial review, it is both unnecessary and danger-
ous to provide a statutory right to hearings as is presently contained 
in S. 698, section 6.1s1 
Given the operational impact of S. 698, it must be ultimately de-
termined if that bill will give the Commission the necessary access 
to funds sufficient to conduct the effective and timely regulation of 
public utilities in Michigan. Obviously to the extent that the de-
ficiency in the present funding provisions is due to the dependence 
of the Commission on the annual state appropriations, S. 698 does 
not alter this dependence. However, it is unrealistic to expect that 
the legislature would grant virtual spending autonomy to the Public 
Service Commission. Given the necessary search for a second-best 
approach, S. 698 is potentially a satisfactory solution. 
Because of the apparently wide scope of assessable charges con-
templated by the phrase "regulation of public utilities," passage of 
S. 698 would result in a substantial revenue gain for the State of 
Michigan. Whereas under the present statutory framework only 
minimal expenses have been assessed against public utilities,182 S. 698 
176. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.556 (1967) (emphasis added). 
177. 273 Mich. at 187, 262 N.W. at 664. 
178. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 460.401 (1967). 
179. See note 153 supra and accompanying text. 
180. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 460.401 (1967). 
181. S. 698, § 6, 76th Mich. Leg., Reg. Sess. (1972). 
182. See notes 119-22 supra and accompanying text. 
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would make the activities of the Public Service Commission, which 
are devoted to the regulation of utilities, essentially self-sustain-
ing-unlike other state departments and operations. Regardless of 
the level of state appropriations allocated by the legislature, there 
will be no net impact on the state budget because that same level of 
appropriations will be passed on to the utility companies through 
assessments. Furthermore, under the amendment183 funds collected 
·will be applied solely to the regulation of public utilities and hence 
cannot be used by the state to subsidize any unrelated state activities. 
Therefore, assuming that the Public Service Commission has a suf-
ficient input into the appropriations process, there is no reason why 
the legislature should deny the Commission effective de facto power 
to set its own level of spending. The legislature would still have the 
ultimate power to control the level of Commission spending, but 
so long as the Commission did not abuse this de facto authority, it 
would be permitted a measure of independence.184 Commission suc-
cess in making its desired appropriations level known will ultimately 
determine the success of this strategy. The Commission is not a sub-
stantial component of the Department of Commerce budget,185 and 
it will therefore have to lobby hard to obtain recognition of its de 
facto powers. Its message to the legislature is simple: everything we 
spend is passed on to the utility companies and nothing we collect 
can be used for purposes other than utility regulation. 
Recognition of this measure of funding independence is also 
subject to a second hurdle. Since the Commission will have to work 
through the appropriations process, there is a strong possibility that 
the utility lobbyists will exert a countervailing pressure within the 
legislature to keep Commission appropriations low. The major 
Michigan utilities retain full-time lobbyists186 and have a strong in-
centive to thwart timely and complete Commission consideration of 
rate applications if S. 699 is passed.187 Although utility support of 
S. 698 may contribute to its passage, the utility companies clearly 
183. See note 160 supra and accompanying text. 
184. It has been argued that the bill 
destroys all budgetary and legislative controls of the Public Service Commission. 
The legislature would no longer have a direct and pecuniary interest in the 
staffing and activities of the Commission in that all costs of operation would be 
directly taxed (and thus recovered) from the subjects being controlled and regu-
lated. This could lead to harassment and over regulation by the Commission 
which ultimately would affect the efficiency of service to the public at large. There 
are no controls in the proposed legislation. 
Guregian letter, supra note 115, at I. 
185. The Department of Commerce appropriation for fiscal 1971 is twenty-nine 
million dollars, whereas the Commission budget is only three million dollars. No. 130, 
[1971) Mich. Acts 1, 11. 
186. Organizations Represented by Legislative Agents, July 1, 1971, on file with the 
Michigan Law Review. 
187. See note 153 supra. 
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regard the bill as the necessary baggage to secure the passage of S. 
699;188 once the bills are passed, utility support of full and adequate 
Commission :financing can be expected to disappear. 
S. 698 provides the most far reaching and yet practical solution 
to the funding difficulties presently faced by the Public Service 
Commission. That bill retains ultimate legislative control over the 
Commission but at the same time offers the Commission the practical 
means to have a vital input into the determination of its annual ap-
propriations. Passage of the bill would strengthen the representa-
tion of the public interest in utility rate proceedings.189 
IV. EVALUATION 
Certainly a major difficulty in any attempt to analyze a state regu-
latory commission is the absence of any standard, absolute or com-
parative, by which to evaluate commission performance. An often 
used standard is a comparison of utility rates between states. Such 
a standard rests on the oversimplified assumption that low utility 
rates can be equated on a one-to-one basis with the furtherance of 
the public interest. But utility rates may reflect localized factors from 
weather conditions to natural resource concentration, and may not 
be an accurate measure of effective regulation. The variation of rate 
structures makes comparison at any single level of consumption 
dangerous, and any price comparison neglects to evaluate the effi-
ciency of service provided. Given these deficiencies in rate compari-
sons, FPC data on electricity rates show that Michigan utility rates 
are lower than the national average.190 
If the attitude of professional analysts and investment bankers is 
188. See note 153 supra. 
189. It should be noted that neither bill is directly responsive to the "overkill" prob-
lem considered in the text following note 123 supra. S. 980 does not deter exorbitant 
company spending, and S. 698 does so only indirectly to the extent that the Commission 
will receive higher appropriations in order to keep up with the demands placed upon 
it by numerous rate applications. This problem bas been considered in the context of 
access to proxy machinery for stockholders challenging incumbent boards of directors 
and management policies. See Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 
83 HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1506-08, 1512-15 (1970). A "defensive matching" concept, such 
as is considered in the Eisenberg article, would be an interesting model on which to 
base allocations for funding of intervenors. However, the analogy between stockholders 
and intervenors breaks down because while in the stockholder context it is argued that 
the insurgents may be conferring a corporate benefit through their objections to man-
agement policies or directors that are not in the best interests of the corporation, in 
utility rate cases the interests of the intervenor are usually inimical to the utility, A 
more direct solution to the "overkill" problem, which bas reportedly been urged by the 
UAW and the Consumer Alliance of Michigan, is a fixed ceiling, perhaps calculated 
as a percentage of gross revenues, on the amount of rate case expenses permitted. 
190. See generally FPC, Typical Electric Bills: Typical Net Monthly Bill as of Jan, 
I, 1970, for Residential, Commercial, and Industrial Services. Note, however, that FPC 
data as of Jan. 1970 do not reflect three subsequent rate increases granted to Detroit 
Edison Co. See note 8 supra. 
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a useful measure of regulatory effectiveness, then the Michigan Pub-
lic Service Commission is doing a strong job of protecting the public 
interest because it is generally regarded as a strict commission.m And 
yet, Commission rigor in maintaining a relatively low rate of return 
for utilities does not ensure the efficient operation of the utility com-
panies. Failure to anticipate growing demand forced Edison to go 
into the bond market at a time of high interest rates, thereby bur-
dening the company with high interest costs for the rest of this cen-
tury,192 and failure to provide environmental safeguards has tied up 
the operation of Consumers Power's nuclear plant on Lake Michi-
gan.rn3 Both companies have seen their bond rating jeopardized.194 
The movement of the Public Service Commission to require long 
range planning in the Edison case195 and order a series of public 
hearings to consider the state's energy needs over the next ten years196 
indicates a belated, but welcome, recognition of the necessity of pro-
gressive and accurate utility planning. Adequacy of staff funding will 
be a crucial determinant of its success. · 
- Because of the complexity of utility regulation, consumers are 
not generally equipped to supervise the ingredients of any single 
rate case such as rate base calculation, test-year adjustments, and 
aggregate revenue requirements. Instead, the public must be content 
to monitor the inputs into the decision-making process such as the 
integrity of the Commissioners, the vitality and adequacy of the staff, 
and the impartiality of the process. Beyond !hat, it must rely on its 
appointed regulators and elected representatives to fulfill the public 
trust. In the words of Franklin Roosevelt: 
The regulating commission, my friends, must be a tribune of the 
people, putting its engineering, its accounting and its legal resources 
into the breach for the purpose of getting the facts and doing justice 
to both the consumers and investors in public utilities. This means, 
when that duty is properly exercised, positive and active protection 
of the people against private greed.197 
191. See Cooper, June 7, supra note 6, at 1, cols. 3-8; Bragg, Edison Battles To 
Keep Bond Rating, Detroit Free Press, May 1, 1972, at 10-B, cols. 3-4. 
192. Detroit Edison has 350 million dollars of long-term debt outstanding at interest 
rates in excess of eight per cent. 1971 DETROIT EDISON ANN. REP. 30. See also Cooper, 
June 7, supra note 6 at 12-A, cols. 3-4. 
193. Lane, supra note 9, at 2-A, cols. 4-6. See text accompanying note 146 supra. 
194. Lane, supra note 9, at 2-A, col. 3; Bragg; supra note 191, at 10-B, cols. 3-4. 
195. See note 94 supra. 
196. Serrin, supra note 9, at 3-A, cols. 3-6. 
197. Address by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Portland, Ore., Sept. 21, 1932, quoted in 
L. METCALF&: V. REINEMER, OVERCHARGE 91 (1967). 
